Review of Steven Cassedy, What Do We Mean When We Talk About Meaning? The Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3): 892-895 (2023)
With Justin Contat, Does Heath Have a Good Answer to Steinberg? Business Ethics Journal Review, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2019)
Etye Steinberg has recently raised a problem for Joseph Heath’s Market Failures Approach. In this paper we consider a response by Heath. We argue that Heath’s response not only leaves the original problem intact, but also raises a second one, analogous to stakeholder theory’s so-called “identification problem.”
Etye Steinberg has recently raised a problem for Joseph Heath’s Market Failures Approach. In this paper we consider a response by Heath. We argue that Heath’s response not only leaves the original problem intact, but also raises a second one, analogous to stakeholder theory’s so-called “identification problem.”
Life Meaning and Sign Meaning, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 47, Issue 3 (2018)
Academic philosophers once dismissed questions about meaning in life as conceptually confused. Only language and related phenomena, it was thought, can have meaning; thus, to ask about the meaning of life is to misapply the concept. Recent work by Susan Wolf, Thaddeus Metz, Aaron Smuts, and others has brought new attention and respectability to the topic. However, while talk of life meaning is no longer considered nonsense, most theorists continue to assume that such talk has nothing to do with meaning in the 'sign' sense that applies to language. In this paper I argue that this assumption is not well justified and that reflection on the example of Sherlock Holmes's life can help us to see why.
Academic philosophers once dismissed questions about meaning in life as conceptually confused. Only language and related phenomena, it was thought, can have meaning; thus, to ask about the meaning of life is to misapply the concept. Recent work by Susan Wolf, Thaddeus Metz, Aaron Smuts, and others has brought new attention and respectability to the topic. However, while talk of life meaning is no longer considered nonsense, most theorists continue to assume that such talk has nothing to do with meaning in the 'sign' sense that applies to language. In this paper I argue that this assumption is not well justified and that reflection on the example of Sherlock Holmes's life can help us to see why.
Coherence, Literary and Epistemic, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol 75, Issue 1 (2017)
Coherence is a term of art in both epistemology and literary criticism, and in both contexts judgments of coherence carry evaluative significance. However, whereas the epistemic use of the term picks out a property of belief-sets, the literary use can pick out properties of various elements of a literary work, including its plot, characters, and style. For this reason, some have claimed that literary critics are not concerned with the same concept of coherence as epistemologists. In this paper I argue against this claim. Although various non-epistemic notions of coherence figure in literary criticism, the epistemic concept has a mirror image in the literary-critical concept of thematic coherence. Moreover, evidence from literary criticism suggests that thematic coherence can be valuable from a literary-evaluative standpoint because it can be valuable from an epistemic standpoint, in particular by enhancing the credibility of a work’s themes or author. My analysis of the notion of thematic coherence thus provides novel support for literary cognitivism, the view that a work’s literary-aesthetic merits can depend on its epistemic merits.
Coherence is a term of art in both epistemology and literary criticism, and in both contexts judgments of coherence carry evaluative significance. However, whereas the epistemic use of the term picks out a property of belief-sets, the literary use can pick out properties of various elements of a literary work, including its plot, characters, and style. For this reason, some have claimed that literary critics are not concerned with the same concept of coherence as epistemologists. In this paper I argue against this claim. Although various non-epistemic notions of coherence figure in literary criticism, the epistemic concept has a mirror image in the literary-critical concept of thematic coherence. Moreover, evidence from literary criticism suggests that thematic coherence can be valuable from a literary-evaluative standpoint because it can be valuable from an epistemic standpoint, in particular by enhancing the credibility of a work’s themes or author. My analysis of the notion of thematic coherence thus provides novel support for literary cognitivism, the view that a work’s literary-aesthetic merits can depend on its epistemic merits.
Justification from Fictional Narratives, Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol 48, Issue 1 (2014)
Philosophers generally accept that a sound argument or strong empirical evidence for a proposition can provide some justification for believing it. Can a make-believe story do the same? In this paper I examine an argument that denies that they can and I assess one popular response to this argument, which seeks to assimilate fictional narratives such as novels and plays to thought experiments. I argue that this analogy helps to explain how fictional narratives can justify propositions at what I call the “micro” level but not at the “macro” level, where other factors such as thematic coherence and the intellectual character of the author typically come into play.
Philosophers generally accept that a sound argument or strong empirical evidence for a proposition can provide some justification for believing it. Can a make-believe story do the same? In this paper I examine an argument that denies that they can and I assess one popular response to this argument, which seeks to assimilate fictional narratives such as novels and plays to thought experiments. I argue that this analogy helps to explain how fictional narratives can justify propositions at what I call the “micro” level but not at the “macro” level, where other factors such as thematic coherence and the intellectual character of the author typically come into play.
Review of Alan Goldman, Philosophy and the Novel, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, Vol 53, Issue 4 (2013)
What's Wrong with Didacticism? British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol 52, Issue 3 (2012)
Works of literature that are too overtly instructive are commonly faulted for being didactic. For so-called literary cognitivists, who believe that instruction is an important literary value, this seems to pose a problem: if we value literature for the instruction it affords, why would we ever object to overt instruction? In this paper I propose the following answer: overt instruction can arouse suspicion of intellectual vices in the author, such as intellectual arrogance, dogmatism, and prejudice, which can make the lessons the author seeks to convey less rationally acceptable. Overt instruction in a work of literature is sometimes a fault, therefore, precisely because it makes the work less valuable as a source of instruction.
Works of literature that are too overtly instructive are commonly faulted for being didactic. For so-called literary cognitivists, who believe that instruction is an important literary value, this seems to pose a problem: if we value literature for the instruction it affords, why would we ever object to overt instruction? In this paper I propose the following answer: overt instruction can arouse suspicion of intellectual vices in the author, such as intellectual arrogance, dogmatism, and prejudice, which can make the lessons the author seeks to convey less rationally acceptable. Overt instruction in a work of literature is sometimes a fault, therefore, precisely because it makes the work less valuable as a source of instruction.